(Part 35)
The Seventh Topic:
The Ruling on Imitation (Taqleed)
The Second Speech: The Detailed Approach
According to this view, imitation is obligatory for common people and prohibited for qualified scholars. This is the stance of the majority of the four Sunni schools (the jumhūr). Here, imitation is defined as accepting someone’s opinion without knowing its evidence.
Supporters of this definition regard imitation in jurisprudential branches as permissible and cite abundant evidence. Historically, most Muslims have followed religious rulings without knowing the underlying proofs. The majority sees no problem in following a specific school of thought under this understanding.
In Response to Objections from the First View:
Supporters of this opinion note that the Companions unanimously permitted laypeople to seek fatwas from scholars. Furthermore, if it is permissible for a layperson to imitate any scholar, it is also permissible to consistently follow one school, which brings peace of mind and protects against confusion from varying fatwas. Regarding the claim that following a single school wasn’t known in early Islam: there’s no compelling evidence that people were prohibited from seeking fatwas from specific individuals. Although there was no formal codification of schools, people still asked the Companions, their followers, and later generations for rulings. As for the argument that imitation leads to prejudice and neglect of evidence, the reply is that only blameworthy prejudice — i.e., rejecting stronger evidence due to fanaticism — is condemned. This has no connection with valid and scholarly imitation. (Sulami, 1426 AH, pp. 478–484) Most Sunni scholars believe that only the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was infallible, and that after him, all people may err. If a just follower recognizes a mistake in the ruling of an Imam or Mufti, they must abandon that ruling. Additionally, the schools of thought have, over a thousand years, been so rigorously refined by scholars that the likelihood of significant errors conflicting with truth is minimal — making blameworthy imitation unlikely.
There is another view from the Hashwiyyah sect, which considers ijtihad forbidden and imitation obligatory (Al-Shawkani, 1419, 2/243). This view may have been valid in its time, but it is incompatible with today’s realities. Contemporary jurisprudential issues are so numerous that only collective scholarly ijtihad can address them effectively. Just as scholars in the time of the early jurists responded to the influx of new challenges with comprehensive legal systems based on Qur’an, Sunnah, consensus, analogy, and more, today’s open world — with its scientific and technological advances and intense Western cultural influence — demands renewed scholarly ijtihad to address emerging issues.